报告题目：Equilibrium strategies in an observable fluid queue with working vacations

报告人:叶晴晴 副教授 南京信息工程大学

照片：

邀请人：李文迪

报告时间：2022年6月18日下午2：30-4：00

报告地点：腾讯会议345-865-580

报告人简介：叶晴晴，南京信息工程大学副教授。2017年毕业于南京理工大学，主要研究领域包括服务运作管理，排队论及排队博弈论。主要致力于①利用排队论对复杂系统进行建模并分析其性能指标；②利用博弈论对服务系统中顾客及管理者行为的均衡策略进行分析。到目前为止，主持国家自然科学基金青年基金一项，江苏省自然科学青年基金一项，江苏省高校自然科学研究面上项目一项，南京信息工程大学科研启动金项目一项。参与国家自然科学基金面上项目一项。已在Int. J. Comput. Math, Methodol. Comput. Appl, Math.Method.Oper. Res, J. Ind. Manag.Optim, RAIRO-Oper. Res，Commun. Stat-Theor. M等期刊发表论文十余篇。

报告摘要：In this talk, we consider a fluid queue with working vacations. Once the buffer becomes empty during the normal busy period, the system will enter a working vacation period during which the outflow rate of fluid will be switched to a lower rate than that in normal busy period. After this working vacation period, if the buffer is non-empty, the outflow rate will be switched to normal rate immediately, otherwise, the system will enter another working vacation until the buffer is non-empty after one working vacation and a new normal busy period starts. For such fluid queue, based on the utility function, we analyze the strategic behavior of the customers, regarding the joining/balking dilemma, under the fully observable case and almost observable case. Furthermore, the expected social benefits are obtained, the corresponding optimal social benefits are also studied and the inefficiency of the equilibrium strategies is quantified via the Price of Anarchy (PoA) measure.

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